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• The size, nature, and significance of the informal sector in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have important implications for how 
countries are affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as 
how policymakers can manage the ensuing socio-economic 
shocks.
• This policy brief discusses how informality complicates 
the implementation of COVID-19 containment measures. 
It addresses the question of how policymakers in SSA 
can effectively fight the pandemic in the context of high 
informality in a way that minimises the negative economic 
impact, as well as how they can appropriately support the 
informal sector through the negative economic shock.
• The brief emphasises policy recommendations to avoid 
blanket lockdowns; tailor lockdowns to accommodate the 
nature of the informal sector; and minimise the use (or 
duration) of tailored lockdowns due to their impacts on the 
livelihoods of informal workers.
• To save lives and safeguard livelihoods in the context of high 
informality, the brief calls for the prioritisation of strategies 
that enhance sharp behavioural changes at the individual level 
and promote strong personal responsibility for compliance to 
the protocols for distancing, hygiene, and the use of face masks.
• Tailored support for the informal sector can be provided 
through informal business associations; reinforced 
microfinance institutions; and temporary utility subsidies 
(electricity, water, and local government rents).
In brief
www.theigc.org/covid-19
This brief is 
published as part of 
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response to the 
economic challenges 
of COVID-19
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Introduction
As countries around the world battle with strategies to contain the spread 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, they are also faced with the difficult challenges 
of safeguarding livelihoods, providing appropriate support to economically 
distressed or displaced persons, and putting the economy on a strong 
recovery path. It has become clear by now that, while the virus is one and 
the same globally, its health, economic, and social impacts can greatly differ 
across contexts. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the youthful population, high 
informality, weak health systems, and the governments’ limited fiscal space 
are factors that make the challenges and impacts of the pandemic unique in 
comparison to other regions.
In particular, the size, pervasiveness, economic and political relevance, and 
pre-existing vulnerabilities of the informal sector in SSA countries present 
complexities in how governments can respond effectively to the COVID-19 
crisis. Consequently, policymakers in SSA are confronted with two main 
questions: 
1. How can they enhance efforts aimed at containing the spread of 
COVID-19 in contexts of high informality in a way that minimises the 
negative economic impacts?
2. How can the informal sector be appropriately supported throughout the 
COVID-19 pandemic, in spite of the difficulties in targeting the relevant 
informal sector enterprises and individuals?  
Nature and relevance of informal sector in SSA
It is large and significantly contributes to the economy
Unlike high income markets, where the informal sector is often referred to as 
the hidden part of the economy, informality in SSA arguably is the norm, as it 
captures over 701 percent of non-agricultural employment and approximately 
90 percent of all economic units (ILO 2018). Informal activity is also highly 
relevant in terms of economic contribution, with estimates ranging from 
30-65 percent of GDP (Charmes 2016). Most businesses in SSA are informal 
in the way they operate2, and major and essential economic activities such 
as public transport operations, market centres, and food processing are 
dominated by informal businesses (Adams et al. 2013; Osei-Boateng and 
Ampratwum 2011).
1. With the exception of Southern Africa where informal employment falls below 50 percent (ILO 2018).
2. For example, a census of business establisments in Ghana shows that 90 percent of businesses in 
Ghana are informal (GSS IBES, 2015).
“... the youthful population, 
high informality, weak 
health systems, and the 
governments’ limited fiscal 
space are factors that make 
the challenges and impacts 
of the pandemic unique 
in comparison to other 
regions.”
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It cuts across every aspect of the economy
The informal sector in SSA is not limited to some sectors or some aspects of 
the economy – it is far reaching, covering all genders, age groups, sectors, 
and most economic activities as shown in Figure 1. Informality presents itself 
in different ways and is often not so clear cut or separated from the formal 
economy. For instance, the informal workers in SSA include self-employed 
persons (this constitutes on average 52 percent of all non-farm workers across 
SSA), persons employed by legitimate businesses that operate informally (11 
percent), persons employed or engaged on an informal basis by businesses 
that operate in the formal sectors (10 percent), and persons who are engaged 
in households as domestic workers (4 percent) (ILO 2018).
Self-employed persons include street traders and petty traders who run 
micro enterprises, but also self-employed persons who operate SMEs and 
employ several others. These informal enterprises are often linked to the 
formal sector very organically. For example, self-employed mobile money 
vendors who operate as informal enterprises are one of the main outlets for 
financial services provided by the telecommunications industry.
Figure 1: % of different people categories engaged in informality in SSA
Source: ILO 2018
It harbours and perpetuates vulnerabilities
 
The informal sector harbours a host of diverse vulnerabilities that expose 
it to suffering the negative implications of external shocks. Depending on 
their severity and persistence, shocks can bear critical implications for the 
individuals and firms operating in it. Here, we discuss two main types of 
vulnerabilities: health and economic.
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• Health and safety: Informal work is often characterised by poor safety 
and health conditions, including hazardous work and long working 
hours, as it falls outside government regulations and control. Informal 
workers are also excluded from public health systems, notably because 
they have greater difficulties paying health insurance contributions or 
accessing health care. For instance, Madagascar, Tanzania, Senegal, 
Cameroon, Niger, and Burkina Faso present less than 10 percent of 
informal sector workers covered by health insurance (OECD/ILO 2019).
• Economic: Informal sector workers face high in-work poverty risk which 
trickles down to entire households and dependants. Actually, among 
workers from poor households, from over 50 percent to as high as 98 
percent (in Cameroon and Rwanda) are informally employed (Bonnet, 
Joann, and Martha, 2019). This poverty risk results from a combination 
of low income and a high dependence on daily earnings for survival. 
Economic vulnerability in turn opens up risks in two further areas:
 − Access to finance: Access to finance is a major challenge for informal 
enterprises (La Porta and Shliefer 2014), which exposes them to 
exploitation in trying to access working capital. For instance, due to the 
difficulties in accessing credit, people in the informal sector sometimes 
fall prey to money lenders (or loan sharks), dubious rotating savings and 
credit association (ROSCA)-type schemes, and even legitimate microcredit 
institutions which can sometime charge exorbitant interest rates in 
contexts where such finance institutions are not properly regulated.
 − Social protection: Possibly the greatest vulnerability comes from 
the fact that official systems of social protection have a tendency to 
systematically bypass informal workers especially in urban areas for 
services such as insurance, sick pay, and unemployment benefits. Two 
sets of interrelated factors usually explain the difficulty for informal 
workers in benefitting from social protection measures: their largely 
unorganised status and their de facto exclusion from regulations and 
benefit from public policy (OECD/ILO 2019). For example, Baremirwe 
Bekoreire et al (2019) point out that existing social protection policy in 
Uganda excludes 93 percent of informal sector workers.
What are the implications for the COVID-19 
pandemic and for policy responses in contexts 
of high informality?
The rate of spread as well as the case fatality of COVID-19 so far in most 
SSA countries has not been nearly as bad as initially feared compared to the 
trajectory of the disease in other regions, including Europe, North America, 
South America, and Asia – with the only exception being South Africa. 
Data from Worldometer indicates that as of 26 August 2020, the region, 
with about 48 countries (i.e., excluding Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Western Sahara), had recorded just a little more than 1 million 
cumulative cases out of the 24.5 million cumulative cases globally, with 
South Africa alone capturing 60 percent of the total. The case fatality rate 
“... official systems of social 
protection have a tendency to 
systematically bypass informal 
workers especially in urban 
areas”
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of the disease calculated at the same period also shows that SSA had a lower 
rate of 2 percent (2 percent excluding South Africa) compared to Europe 
(6 percent), North America (4 percent) and South America (3 percent). As 
shown in Figure 3, the region has had a much flatter curve with respect to 
the weekly new cases compared to other regions. Nevertheless, the challenge 
of managing both the spread of COVID-19 and the consequences of the 
negative economic impact in the region is made more difficult by the high 
levels of informality. Some of these complications are highlighted below:
Figure 2: Weekly new COVID-19 cases in deaths in SSA and Europe
 
Source: The data was taken from Our World in Data, 2020 and organised by the authors into 
weekly new cases and deaths.
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COVID-19 exposes informal workers to income and livelihood losses
As indicated in the previous section, most informal sector workers are faced with 
low and unreliable incomes which leave them most vulnerable to the negative 
economic shocks triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. This implies that: 
1. The economic vulnerabilities faced by informal sector workers will likely 
worsen. Informal workers, whether wage workers or self-employed, are 
arguably the group facing the highest risk of losing jobs and incomes if 
lockdowns or movement restrictions are imposed. Low level of savings, 
poor access to finance, income volatility and uncertainty, and the limited 
or absent coverage of social security and protection systems will not allow 
informal workers to withstand the fall in economic activity for a long 
time. Many informal firms may increase their demand for loans, given low 
cash reserves to fall back on during hard times, and microfinance lenders 
might take advantage of the situation and apply high interest rates that 
could further limit access to finance, unless properly regulated.
2. More people will be pushed in extreme poverty. Informal work provides 
livelihoods for many who would otherwise live in extreme poverty. 
However, many informal workers tend to also live close to the poverty 
line hence they face a higher risk of in-work poverty (Danquah et al. 
2019). The World Bank has estimated that the COVID-19 pandemic 
will push 49 million new people into extreme poverty. Although health 
impacts in SSA have proved less severe than in the rest of the world, the 
World Bank projections suggest that it will be the region that will face the 
highest increase in extreme poverty, with about 23 million new people at 
risk, the vast majority of which will be represented by informal workers 
already close to the poverty line.
The informal sector provides an opportunity for alternative 
livelihoods for the newly unemployed
The informal sector in SSA is expected to expand as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic. This inherently means people will turn to the informal sector for 
survival. Thus, although being in the informal sector increases the likelihood 
of being pushed into extreme poverty by the pandemic, informality will also 
be a lifeline for some to escape extreme poverty.
This is because informality provides flexible ways for people to earn a living 
with very little capital. The sharp economic downturn is likely to lead to an 
expansion of the informal sector in SSA through the following mechanisms: 
1. People who are laid off from both formal and informal firms may decide 
to start their own businesses which they are most likely to operate 
informally, at least within the short- to medium-term. Basically, they will 
look for opportunities to earn a living as unemployment benefits may 
not reach them. Informal businesses and activities are relatively easy to 
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start by anyone irrespective of age, gender, location, and usually with any 
capital one can get.
2. There may also be formal sector businesses which will terminate the 
employment of regular staff and engage workers on an informal basis. 
Some formal enterprises may even shut down, but individuals from those 
enterprises may carry on doing the same activity informally.
As a result of the cushioning mechanism provided by the informal 
sector, most SSA countries will not see a huge rise in the traditional 
rate of unemployment (as defined by the ILO), but rather a rise in 
underemployment and vulnerable employment due to informality.
Containment strategies in contexts of high informality are likely 
to be less effective
The size and ubiquity of the informal sector in SSA complicate government 
efforts to implement some of the known non-pharmaceutical containment 
strategies, such as lockdowns, movement restrictions, social distancing, and 
working from home policies. This is mainly because: 
1. The activities of informal businesses are harder to regulate or streamline 
in line with the containment strategies as many do not fall under any 
regulatory authority.
2. The hand-to-mouth nature of jobs for many in informality is likely to 
induce individuals to ignore regulations, leave their homes, and continue 
working in order to provide for themselves and their household.
3. Many informal sector activities and occupations fall in the category 
of “essential services” and often involve direct person-to-person 
contact (e.g., markets, street food vendors, public transport providers, 
hairdressers, etc.) which may facilitate the spread of the virus. 
High informality limits the options available for government 
support
Given the nature of the informal sector and how it operates, it is very difficult 
to design policies that can target and support the businesses and workers 
in the sector appropriately. Most of the conventional policy measures such 
as PAYE tax refunds, tax waivers, and other forms of targeted business and 
income support programmes that governments could resort to are simply 
not applicable to informal enterprises and workers. This significantly limits 
government options for meaningful interventions.
This limitation is further compounded by the fact that most of the countries 
in SSA do not have enough resources to finance the large spending needed 
on such programmes. Even in normal times, most SSA countries have very 
limited fiscal space, partly because they struggle to design tax policies that 
are appropriate to tax thriving businesses in the informal sector. Moreover, 
the pandemic is also expected to worsen fiscal capacity due to a combination 
of falling foreign exchange earnings and lower tax receipts from the formal 
sector. 
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Policy considerations
How can policymakers enhance their efforts aimed at 
containing the spread of COVID-19 in the contexts of high 
informality?
1. Adopt tailored and localised lockdowns
Blanket and prolonged lockdowns are too costly to livelihoods in the informal 
sector and will not work. At the beginning of the pandemic, several SSA 
countries introduced lockdowns of various kinds to help contain the spread 
of the virus early. These were useful in helping people to internalise the gravity 
of the situation. The lockdowns also gave governments the opportunity to 
undertake effective contact tracing, testing, isolation of patients, and use this 
initial data on cases to understand how fast the virus was spreading within 
their respective countries. This was the case in Ghana, Senegal, and South 
Africa.
However, as pointed out in the IGC’s COVID-19 policy guidance note, the 
extended blanket lockdowns risked causing widespread deprivation and 
unintended health consequences. This has been seen in a number of recent 
surveys in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. A recent IGC working paper 
(Alon et al. 2020) shows that, not only are extended lockdowns costly to 
livelihoods in the informal sector in SSA, but they are also ineffective in 
containing the spread of the disease in those contexts as many informal 
sector workers will be forced to go out for work to avoid starvation in breach 
of the lockdown orders. The analysis in the study also shows that extended 
blanket lockdowns are unnecessary in SSA because of the age structure of the 
population in these countries (dominated by young people) coupled with the 
known fatality rates of COVID-19 for different age groups.
Lockdowns should be carefully tailored to suit local context, taking into 
account the large numbers of relatively young people who need to work daily 
to survive in the informal sector, with a significant number of them providing 
essential services. In addition, the tailored lockdowns could also be localised 
to circumscribed hotspots to minimise the broader economic impacts on 
livelihoods. For instance in Ghana, the government implemented a partial 
lockdown in the two main cities for 21 days. During the period of lockdown, 
all markets, food vendors, restaurants, and public transport providers were 
allowed to operate, making it possible for large sections of the informal 
sector to continue working. The market places were closed only for a day for 
disinfection, and distancing measures were put in place to allow markets to 
stay open through the period.
2. Localised income support
Social protection for the poor (in cash or in-kind income support) is necessary 
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during the brief periods of tailored lockdowns. However, blanket policies 
that do not take into account local contexts, even for basic social protection 
in the form of cash or in-kind transfers to informal sector workers, are neither 
practical nor financially sustainable.
However, for the duration of localised lockdowns, governments should 
find safe ways of providing cash transfers or in-kind support (e.g., hot 
meals) for the poor. Failing to provide measures that cushion the immediate 
consequences of the interruption of economic activity is likely to reduce 
individual incentives to comply with lockdown protocols, which risk being 
disregarded as individuals find alternative ways to support their livelihoods. 
Income support measures should target the poorest in society, which includes 
sections of informal sector workers who are most vulnerable to starvation 
(e.g., street sellers, young women who carry goods for people in the markets, 
etc.).
It is important that such programmes are implemented in a safe manner, 
avoiding the use of large gatherings and observing distancing measures. 
The use of mobile money transfers may be useful for this purpose, and local 
governments may be well placed to lead the implementation phase.
3. Intensified awareness raising and trust building
Given the limited pharmaceutical solutions for treating the disease effectively 
and the current lack of a vaccine, a sharp behavioural change is required to 
help reduce the spread of the virus through existing non-pharmaceutical 
measures. For this to happen in highly informal settings, individuals need 
to take personal responsibility for their safety since the formal workplace 
structure do not exist to guide and promote compliance. This means people 
need to be well informed about the risks they face, what behaviours to follow, 
and how to act if they suspect they caught the virus.
Targeted efforts to ensure that people in the informal sector comply 
voluntarily will help to significantly reduce spread of the virus and ensure that 
many can continue to work safely throughout the pandemic. This can be done 
effectively through awareness and trust building.
Awareness programmes targeting markets and other centres dominated 
by informal sector operators should be implemented rapidly, and toll-free 
numbers should be created for people to access testing and to get treatment 
if confirmed positive, and to seek information. Additionally, governments 
could partner with telecommunications companies to share information and 
updates with their citizens via SMS delivered on personal mobile phones. 
Information should be available in multiple local languages and shared widely 
at the national, city, and community level through information vans, local 
radio announcements, and dedicated messaging on television.
Furthermore, people are more likely to follow regulations if they trust them 
to be true. To build trust, authorities should provide frequent daily updates 
“Failing to provide 
measures that cushion 
the immediate 
consequences of 
the interruption of 
economic activity 
is likely to reduce 
individual incentives to 
comply with lockdown 
protocols”
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on infections and case management. Measures must be put in place to ensure 
that tests are conducted quickly and people are informed about their test 
results in a timely fashion. To encourage people with symptoms to promptly 
report and get tested, governments should also take steps to discourage 
stigmatisation and fear of those who have recovered from the virus. The 
WHO has provided a useful 5 page guide to preventing and addressing social 
stigma for COVID-19.
Government should also consider and harness the influence of traditional 
authorities and other relevant stakeholders such as community leaders, and 
leaders of faith-based organisations to improve trust and compliance in the 
population. For instance, Banerjee et al (2020) show that an informative 
short video message on preventive measures delivered via SMS by a publicly 
acclaimed intellectual had positive and large effects on the behaviour of 
recipients (including reporting of symptoms, washing hands, wearing masks, 
and staying at home) in West Bengal, with positive spillover effects towards 
non-recipients.
What can policymakers in SSA do to appropriately support the large 
informal sector through the COVID-19-related economic crises?
1. Strengthen and support microfinance lending at reduced 
interest rates
Government should take steps to quickly streamline and boost microfinance 
lending to the informal sector. Microfinance, savings and loans, and other 
financial NGOs are a major source of finance and capital for the informal sector 
(Trombetta et al. 2017) as well as a major contributor to poverty reduction 
(Danquah et al. 2020). These institutions are able to build relationships with 
informal enterprises and workers at their places of work in a unique way. 
However, as noted earlier, these institutions can take undue advantage of 
struggling informal enterprises and workers through extreme interest rates, up 
to 70-100 percent, and thus need to be appropriately regulated and monitored 
(Roodman and Morduch 2009; Chang 2010; Sanberg 2012; Bateman 2015).
The severe economic downturn expected as a result of the pandemic is likely 
to erode the savings and working capital of many informal enterprises. 
This will push more informal businesses to seek loans from predatory loan 
sharks and institutions. For example, the COVID-19 business tracker survey, 
which includes informal firms (conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service), 
indicates that access to loans with subsidised interest rates is one of the top 
needs of firms in Ghana during this period.
Governments can support these credit institutions in providing low interest 
loans to informal businesses and workers. Microfinance institutions are 
best placed to identify and properly target struggling informal business, and 
provide demand-driven support. They are also likely to continue building 
a sustained relationship with the business in a way that will ensure future 
improvements in managerial practices as well as other desirable outcomes 
such as financial inclusion. Governments could use this as an opportunity 
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to streamline and improve the regulation of such microcredit financial 
institution if they have not properly done so already.
2. Encourage the formation of informal business associations
Several parts of the informal sector in some SSA countries are organised 
into politically powerful, coordinated business associations that are able to 
provide welfare support to members, negotiate with governments, provide 
data and useful information for decision making, enforce some minimum 
regulations, and even provide basic social welfare support to their members. 
For example, in Ghana, public road transport is largely provided by individual 
transport owners who normally own just one or a few minibuses or buses 
which they run informally. However, they operate through unions such as the 
Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) at the community level, and 
under a national level apex union (Abekah-Nkrumah et al. 2019).
Governments should consider encouraging the formation of such unions or 
informal business associations in strategic sectors of the economy dominated 
by informal operators as these could be used to facilitate government financial 
support, improve targeting, better understand informal workers’ challenges 
and needs, and thus alleviate the negative COVID-19 economic impact on 
informal enterprises
3. Temporary subsidies for electricity, water, rent
A number of countries across SSA such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Gabon, Ghana, and Togo 
have implemented various types of temporary subsidies on utilities, including 
water and electricity. These range from 50-100% subsidies for a two-nine 
month period for all residents, commercial users, or residents in cities that 
have been particular affected by the pandemic (IMF 2020). Some countries 
have specifically targeted such subsides towards enterprises and households 
whose past usage does not exceed a fixed quantity or volume, while others 
have simply waived the VAT charges on such utilities for the period. In 
certain cases, instead, local government rent charged in markets, as well local 
government business taxes (mainly paid by informal business) were lowered 
or waived for 2020.
Such temporary subsidies and waivers provide an effective way of reaching 
informal enterprises where it matters – by reducing production costs – 
because previous utility consumption data are often available, and they can 
be used to enhance targeting. This form of support can be transparently 
costed and delivered, and would directly reach informal activities, a large 
portion of which happens within households. Furthermore, such subsidies 
could subsequently be linked to business registration as a way of promoting 
formalisation. This will help countries create databases for effective targeting 
in the future, among other benefits.
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